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CARBON TAXATION IN IRELAND. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF 
REVENUE RECYCLING POLICIES1 
 
Miguel Angel Tovar Reaños* and Muireann Lynch 
ABSTRACT 
We calculate the impact of an increase in carbon taxation on carbon emissions and 
on income inequality. Carbon emissions reduce by 3.94 per cent for a carbon tax 
increase of €30 per tonne, and 10.24 per cent for an increase of €80 per tonne. 
Carbon taxation is found to be regressive, with poorer households spending a 
greater proportion of their income on the tax than more affluent households. 
However, returning the carbon tax revenues to households reverses this regressive 
effect, and the net policy effect is progressive. A ‘carbon cheque’ that distributes 
the revenues equally to every household leads to small changes in income 
inequality, while a targeted mechanism that directs more of the revenues towards 
less affluent households is more progressive, and actually reduces income 
inequality. The targeted mechanism resembles recycling the revenues through the 
tax and welfare system, and thus has lower administrative costs than a ‘carbon 
cheque’.  
1. INTRODUCTION      
Carbon pricing or taxation has been endorsed by many as an important tool in 
combatting climate change by reducing carbon emissions in the most cost-effective 
manner, while inducing minimal distortions in other markets (Nordhaus, 1993). 
The general principle of carbon taxation as an appropriate mechanism to reduce 
carbon emissions enjoys broad support amongst economists.2 
 
However, significant public concerns over carbon taxation remain. Energy 
affordability is an important consideration for citizens, as is the extent to which 
carbon taxes impact on income inequality (Kolstad et al., 2014). Because poorer 
households spend a greater share of their income on energy, carbon taxes can 
impact on both energy affordability and income inequality. The impact of carbon 
taxation on rural households is also of concern. Finally, the ability of carbon 
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taxation to bring about a decrease in emissions, particularly if households are 
unable to readily switch to alternative fuels, is sometimes questioned (Patt and 
Lilliestam, 2018; Vasilakou, 2010).  
 
At least some of these concerns can be addressed by appropriate recycling of the 
revenue raised by carbon taxation. If the revenue is returned to households, either 
directly or via the tax and welfare systems, concerns over energy affordability can 
be addressed. Assuming the revenue received by each household is at least as great 
as the household expenditure on carbon tax, there is no net effect on energy 
affordability. Furthermore, appropriate targeting of the recycled revenues can 
leave income inequality unchanged, or even reduced. Klenert et al. (2018) provide 
a thorough review of the range of the various revenue recycling mechanisms that 
can be employed by policymakers.  
 
The choice of recycling mechanism is very important because a poorly designed 
instrument could exacerbate rather than attenuate an increase in income 
inequality caused by the tax itself (see Williams, 2016). The cost of implementing 
the policy itself should also be taken into consideration. For example, the 
administrative cost of recycling revenue through a direct transfer is likely to be 
higher than that of changing taxation and social welfare payment rates and 
thresholds. This higher administration cost reduces the total amount of revenue 
available for distribution amongst households. 
 
In Ireland, carbon is seen as a core element of the transition to a sustainable 
economy (DCCAE, 2017) and a carbon tax was introduced in 2010, which applies to 
the non-ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme) sector only. There is broad political 
agreement that this tax should be increased (Committee on Climate Action, 2019). 
New research on the implications of increased carbon taxes for emissions, 
affordability and inequality is therefore warranted and is the focus of this research. 
 
Research on carbon taxation in Ireland has been carried out since as early as 1992 
(FitzGerald and McCoy, 1992). Several of the studies take a macroeconomic 
perspective and model the economy as a whole. As a result, these can calculate 
the impact of carbon taxation on various sectors of the economy as well as on 
households (Bergin et al., 2004; Wissema and Dellink, 2007; Conefrey et al., 2013). 
They can also calculate the changes in behaviour induced by carbon taxation and 
the resulting reduction in emissions. These papers cited above consider the impact 
of the introduction of a carbon tax, however (de Bruin & Yakut, 2019) develop and 
use the I3E model to consider the impact of a carbon taxation increase. They find 
that a carbon tax can reduce emissions and that recycling carbon tax revenues to 
households sees the nominal income of households rise, although the real income 
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falls, due to an increase in inflation. The CGE models reviewed above cannot, 
however, take account of individual household characteristics and behaviour, and 
do not consider how different categories of household are affected by carbon 
taxation, which requires the use of microdata. Research on carbon taxation that 
does rely on Irish microdata includes Scott and Eakins, 2004 and Callan et al., 2009. 
Carbon taxes are found by each of the above papers to be regressive, but this 
literature also finds that the regressive effects can be reversed if the revenue raised 
from the tax is recycled appropriately back to households. However these models 
are unable to account for behavioural changes as a result of the tax, and instead 
assume that household carbon emissions continue unabated after the tax is 
introduced. While this may be a plausible short-run assumption, it is unlikely to 
apply in the long run. 
 
This research represents a significant advance on the state of the art by examining 
the impact of increased carbon taxation on both carbon emissions and household 
income and equality. Carbon taxation mainly affects household expenditure on 
energy-related commodities like fuel and transport, as these goods become more 
expensive. However, carbon taxation also affects expenditure on non-energy-
related commodities by shifting the share of the household budget that is spent on 
each type of commodity. In order to estimate the effects of carbon taxation on 
expenditure on both energy- and non-energy-related commodities, we use 
microdata from the Household Budget Survey of Ireland (HBS). This research also 
considers the impact of recycling the carbon revenue back to households, using 
both a flat allocation and a targeted allocation. 
 
Our results show that carbon taxes are an effective means of reducing both CO2 
emissions and income inequality when the tax revenue is properly allocated and 
targeted to protect vulnerable households. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
2.1  Demand system estimation 
We employ the Exact Aﬃne Stone Index demand system (EASI, see Lewbel and 
Pendakur, 2009) to model household behaviour. A demand system is a method of 
determining how consumer behaviour responds to changes in prices. Consumption 
decisions are represented as a system of equations which depend on prices, 
consumption budgets, and observed as well as unobserved household 
characteristics. Unlike previous models of household demand, the EASI allows for 
a flexible representation of the relationship between household expenditure on a 
particular commodity and the household’s total disposable income. Demand 
systems have been used to study households’ energy use and carbon emissions 
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(Creedy and Sleeman, 2006; Pashardes et al., 2014; Tovar Reaños and Wolfing, 
2018), but, to our knowledge, this study which employs the EASI demand system 
to examine the distributional implications of carbon taxation, taking revenue 
recycling into account, is unique in the literature. It is also the first study to apply 
the EASI to Irish data. The outputs of the model can be used to estimate a 
household expenditure function, which represents the quantities of each 
commodity consumed by a household, given that the household faces a budget 
restriction. Changes in the price of one commodity, for example increasing energy 
prices due to a carbon tax, means households will choose a different bundle of 
commodities in response: in other words, their expenditure on all commodities will 
change, not just energy-related commodities. We quantify the cost to households 
from carbon taxation, by determining the adjustment in household income needed 
to accept a different commodity bundle.3 This cost will in turn change income 
distribution and consequently income inequality. We used Atkinson’s inequality 
index to measure these changes in income inequality (see Tovar Reaños and 
Wolfing, 2018).4 
 
To apply the model, data on household expenditure on different commodities, 
commodity prices and other socioeconomic variables are needed. Using the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) from the Central Statistical Office (CSO), we use 
the following waves from the HBS to estimate our demand system; 2015-2016, 
2009, 2004, 1999 and 1994. We group consumption goods into six categories: food, 
housing, heating and lighting, transport, education and leisure, and other goods 
and services.5 A similar approach has been used in Tovar Reaños and Wolfing 
(2018) and by Bohringer et al. (2017). The grouping largely follows the 
Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). As in 
Baker et al. (1989) we do not include purchase of vehicles and big appliances such 
as washing machines, dryers, etc. as part of the commodity bundles. Instead, 
dummy variables for ownership of these commodities are included in the analysis. 
Energy is comprised of expenditure on electricity, natural gas, liquid fuels and solid 
fuels. Transport expenditure comprises petrol and/or diesel, vehicular 
maintenance, insurance and public transport. Because carbon taxes affect the 
prices of both heating and fuels for private transportation,6 we can estimate the 
changes in income distribution for both groups.  
 
                                                          
 
3  After estimating an expenditure function we are able to estimate Hicks’ equivalent variation.  
4  We follow King (1983) to estimate equivalent income and inequality. 
5  This aggregation maximises the use of the data because it considerably reduces the number of households 
reporting zero expenditure in any given category.  
6  While expenditure on electricity is included in the HBS dataset and in our model, carbon taxes do not apply 
to electricity consumption because electricity generation is covered by the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS). Therefore a change in carbon tax changes the prices of heating and transportation 
fuels, but not of electricity. 
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A potential caveat is that the parameters for transportation include both public 
and private transport. However, once we compared our results with a model that 
only includes private transport, our results are slightly higher, and the general 
conclusion found in this report holds.7 Full details of the model can be found in 
Tovar Reaños and Lynch, 2019. 
2.2 Energy consumption with no carbon taxation increase 
Figure 1 shows that low income households spend the largest share of their budget 
on residential energy. The consumption in this sector comprises electricity and 
fuels for heating. Similar patterns are found for the expenditure on private 
transportation as shown in Figure 2. This shows that higher energy prices (via a 
carbon tax or otherwise) will potentially harm low income households 
disproportionally. This tallies with results from previous research. 
 
FIGURE 1  BUDGET SHARE OF EXPENDITURE ON HEATING AND LIGHTING USED IN THE 
RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ACROSS EXPENDITURE QUARTILES  
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
 
                                                          
 
7  We use a Heckman correction to estimate a demand system for only vehicle owners as in West and Williams 
(2007). For full details of this estimation see Tovar et al., 2019. 
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FIGURE 2  BUDGET SHARE OF EXPENDITURE ON DIESEL AND PETROL USED IN PRIVATE 
TRANSPORTATION ACROSS EXPENDITURE QUARTILES 
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
FIGURE 3  CARBON EMISSIONS BY INCOME QUARTILE (TONNES) 
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
Figure 3 shows the carbon emissions per household. More affluent households 
have higher emissions. This calls for the implementation of a progressive policy 
instrument where carbon taxes increase with income. 
3. MICROSIMULATION  
Having determined the expenditure of each income quartile on fuels and 
transportation, we now determine the impact of a change in carbon taxation on 
behaviour. This is the major contribution of this piece of research. For this exercise, 
we use only the 2015-2016 wave of the HBS because it has the most recent data. 
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In addition, we use emission factors and prices of energy commodities provided by 
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI).8 As in Callan et al. (2009), we 
only consider direct emissions. 
 
It is important to note here that the model is a partial equilibrium model, and 
consequently it is not able to estimate changes in labour supply or in the supply of 
commodities purchased by households as a result of carbon taxes. This will be the 
focus of future research. 
4. SCENARIOS  
We analyse two carbon tax scenarios, where we consider an additional carbon tax 
of €30 and €80 per tonne respectively. When combined with the existing carbon 
tax of €20 per tonne, total carbon taxes come to €50 and €100 per tonne. In the 
baseline scenario, households pay the current carbon tax (i.e. €20 per tonne).  
 
Furthermore, we analyse two mechanisms for recycling the additional carbon tax 
revenue; a flat allocation and a targeted allocation. The flat allocation scenario 
resembles the green cheque, which has been advocated by some policymakers; an 
equal cash transfer is given to every household, the sum total of which is equal to 
the total carbon tax revenue. Under the targeted scenario, the revenue is 
distributed amongst households in inverse proportion to the households’ share of 
aggregate income, according to the following equations: 
∑ 𝑋ℎ
𝐻
ℎ
𝑋ℎ
=  𝑟ℎ 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑋ℎ =  
𝑟ℎ
∑ 𝑟ℎℎ
 
 
where 𝑋ℎ is each household’s total expenditure and 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑋ℎ calculates the share 
of the total carbon tax revenues that accrue to each household ℎ. The first 
equation calculates the inverse of each household’s share of aggregate 
expenditure, and the second equation normalises this in order to ensure that the 
sum of all the shares to adds to one. 
 
This allocation mechanism is designed to resemble social welfare transfers, which 
broadly accrue to households in inverse proportion to income (with some 
exceptions). 
 
                                                          
 
8  Emission factors can be found at www.seai.ie/resources/publications/Energy-Emissions-2017-Final.pdf 
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5. RESULTS9 
5.1  Initial incidence 
5.1.1  Household level  
Table 1 displays how the cost of increasing the carbon tax by an additional €30 per 
tonne falls on the household types with the largest incidence across the income 
quartiles as a proportion of total expenditure. Every household bears some cost, 
but the cost is greatest for the poorest households. Comparing the ﬁrst and fourth 
quartiles indicates that poorer households (1st quartile) suffer disproportionately 
more from carbon taxes. In addition, single households with children are the most 
affected by this policy.  
 
It should be noted here that this table includes no assumption on how the revenues 
from carbon taxes are utilised. In essence, the table shows the cost of increasing 
the carbon tax but assumes that the revenue raised from so doing exits the 
economy entirely. We relax this assumption further on. Note that our metric 
measures the cost of the policy as the extra income that the household would 
require, were they to choose their original bundle of commodities, but at the new 
set of energy prices.  
 
TABLE 1 HICK’S EQUIVALENT VARIATION RELATIVE TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
  1st_quartile 2nd_quartile 3rd_quartile 4th_quartile 
Single_no_children -0.83 -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.23*** 
Single_+65 -0.94 -0.58 -0.41 -0.16*** 
Single_with_children -1.01*** -0.67*** -0.45 -0.37 
All_households -0.88 -0.59 -0.48 -0.39 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
Notes: Statistically signiﬁcant with respect to the sample mean in each quartile *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
The following graph shows how the tax burden is distributed across different 
expenditure quartiles. In addition, the graph is broken down by rural and urban 
households.10 One can see that rural households are disproportionally more 
affected, particularly rural households in the lowest income quartile. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  Own-price, cross-price and expenditure elasticities can be found in Tovar et al., 2019. 
10  Rural and urban households are defined by the CSO regarding population size and proximity with 
aggregated town areas (see www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp1hii/cp1hii/bgn). 
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FIGURE 4  DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CARBON TAX FOR URBAN AND RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation.  
 
Table 2 shows the average cost per week of carbon taxation on different household 
types in monetary terms. Households living in older dwellings and low skilled 
workers have larger costs. Callan et al. (2009) used a different approach and 
estimated an average cost per week of more than €4 for an additional carbon tax 
of €20 per tonne. Our results are at the lower bound of this estimate, which is 
inevitable as our model includes the behavioural effects of carbon taxation. We 
can simulate the extent to which households will reduce their carbon consumption 
as a result of the tax, thereby reducing the tax that they pay (as well as reducing 
total emissions). 
 
TABLE 2 CARBON TAX COST (€/WEEK). OWN ESTIMATED HICK’S EQUIVALENT VARIATION 
  Tax_+30 Tax_+80 
Dwelling_1980 -3.037*** -7.467 *** 
Low_skill -3.126 *** -7.726 *** 
All_households -2.772 -6.841 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
Notes:  Values have been equalised to consider household size. Statistically signiﬁcant with respect to the sample mean in each quartile. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
 
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
M
ea
n
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
va
ri
at
io
n
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
Expenditure quartile
Rural Urban
€30 CO2 tax increase €80 CO2 tax increase
 
10 
5.1.2 Aggregated level  
The cost of the policy faced by households estimated in the previous section will 
also have distributional effects at aggregate level. Table 3 shows the changes in 
income inequality, total expenditure per capita and CO2 emissions as a result of the 
carbon tax. In the absence of revenue recycling, income inequality, as measured 
by the Atkinson index, increases. This is due to the regressive nature of carbon 
taxation. In addition, after paying for the carbon tax, the total expenditure of 
households declines by between 0.46 per cent and 1.14 per cent. A tax increase of 
€30 and €80 per tonne decreases CO2 emissions by 3.94 per cent and 10.24 per 
cent respectively, due to the behavioural changes made by households in response 
to the tax. 
 
TABLE 3 CHANGES IN INEQUALITY, EXPENDITURE AND EMISSIONS IN % 
Tax Inequality % Expenditure % Emissions % 
+€30 0.40 -0.46 -3.94 
+€80 1.04 -1.14 -10.24 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
5.2  Revenue recycling  
We now consider the effects of recycling carbon tax revenue to households. Figure 
5 shows how the cost of an additional €80 per tonne changes when the flat and 
targeted allocations described above are used. A flat allocation, while equal in 
monetary terms for each household, is larger in comparison to total expenditure 
for poorer households than for richer households. For this reason, the flat 
allocation compensates poorer households more than richer households as a 
proportion of expenditure. However, a more targeted measure benefits the 
poorest households far more than the flat measure. The targeted measure is 
therefore more progressive, which is appropriate given that higher income 
households emit higher levels of carbon. 
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FIGURE 5  DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT REVENUE RECYCLING MECHANISM 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation.  
 
Administrative costs are not included in this analysis, but it should be noted here 
that the administrative cost of the targeted scenario is likely to be lower than that 
of the flat allocation. This is due to the fact that the flat allocation would most likely 
have to be achieved by implementing a new mechanism in which a cash payment 
is delivered to each household, and there is currently no national register of 
households in the State. In contrast, the targeted mechanism proposal is along the 
lines of that proposed in Callan et al. (2009), in which the revenues are recycled 
through the existing tax and welfare system. It is unlikely that the targeted 
mechanism proposed here could be replicated with 100 per cent accuracy via the 
existing tax and social welfare mechanisms, but the general principle of a targeted 
mechanism being preferable to a flat allocation has been established.  
 
In order to evaluate the general effects of the policies, Table 4 shows the effects of 
the tax increase and revenue recycling on inequality and expenditure. A flat 
allocation can reduce inequality and increase the average expenditure available for 
households. Recycling mechanisms can thus not only reverse the regressive effects 
of carbon taxation, but can actually reduce rather than increase income inequality. 
The targeted mechanism has even larger effects, potentially doubling the benefits 
obtained by the flat allocation mechanism. 
 
The degree to which recycling mechanisms can reduce income inequality increases 
as carbon taxation increases. This is because higher carbon taxes yield higher 
revenues, and so if appropriate recycling mechanisms are chosen, the reductions 
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in inequality are greater. 
 
TABLE 4 CHANGES IN INEQUALITY, EXPENDITURE. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TWO  
RE-ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
Flat allocation  
Carbon tax Inequality % Expenditure % 
+€30 -0.46 0.16 
+€80 -1.05 0.41 
Targeted allocation 
Carbon tax Inequality % Expenditure % 
+€30 -1.23 0.16 
+€80 -2.78 0.41 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This work examined the impact of increased carbon taxation in Ireland, and 
quantified the impact of same on carbon emissions using Irish microlevel data for 
the first time. Our results find a 3.94 per cent reduction in carbon emissions if 
carbon taxes are increased by €30 per tonne, and an 10.24 per cent reduction in 
emissions if taxes are increased by €80 per tonne. The evidence suggests that 
carbon taxation is a valid and important part of climate policy. 
 
Results from previous research, which find that carbon taxes are regressive, are 
repeated here. The impact on rural households is particularly evident. However, 
the fact that appropriate revenue recycling can reverse these regressive effects 
diminishes the validity of distributional issues as an argument against increasing 
carbon taxation. In fact, carbon taxation coupled with revenue recycling has the 
potential to be a useful tool for mitigating income inequality, independent of 
climate policy. In our scenario, the flat allocation mimics the carbon cheque, which 
has been proposed as a potential revenue recycling mechanism in Ireland. While 
this re-allocation mechanism can reduce inequality, our alternative scenario of the 
targeted mechanism can bring larger reductions in income inequality.  
 
Our model does not estimate the overall macroeconomic cost of policy reforms 
because it is a partial equilibrium model. In the same line, our changes in CO2 
emissions are direct emissions and do not consider the overall changes in 
emissions. Further research is needed to have a macro and micro vison of the cost 
of the policy reform. Finally, it should be noted that our results simulate 
behavioural changes based on historical data, which are influenced by the climate, 
energy and other policies in place at the time the data were collected. Future 
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climate and energy policies, independent of carbon taxation, have the potential to 
shift behaviour even further. For example, measures such as improved public 
transportation or congestion charging in city centres could reduce the level of 
carbon taxation at which commuters move away from private motorised 
transportation and towards public transport and/or walking or cycling. In other 
words, these policies would increase the price-responsiveness of commuters to 
carbon taxation, resulting in even greater emission reductions for a given level of 
carbon taxation. The interplay between carbon taxation and other climate and 
energy policies should therefore be taken into consideration by policymakers. 
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